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BOOK REVIEW

Right and Remedy
REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN

THE ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM. By Larry W. Yackle.* New York: Oxford

University Press, 1989. Pp. xii, 322. $35.00.
Reviewed by Barry Friedmant
I. INTRODUCTION

I came to Alabama in 1982, to interview for a position as a visiting
professor at the University of Alabama School of Law. A large group of
the faculty took me to lunch that day. I did not understand until much
later that the conversation at lunch was an important part of the interview. The group moved from one topic of discussion to another, until
we lighted on an area of the law in which I was willing to take and
defend a position. That topic proved to be federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, and it only made sense that the chief devil's advocate was
Larry Yackle. Yackle is one of the foremost commentators on habeas
corpus, and it is little coincidence that his first book-Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama
Prison System-is his account of the prison litigation in Alabama.'
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. B.A., 1968, J.D., 1973, University of
Kansas; LL.M., Harvard University, 1974.
t Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A., University of Chicago, 1978; J.D.,
Georgetown University, 1982. I would like to thank Jim Ely, Don Hall, Jason Johnston, Ralph
Knowles, Sue Palmer, Bob Rasmussen, Debbie Reichle, Jim Ruggeri, Gerry Spann, Julian Wright,

and Nick Zeppos for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Book Review. Debbie Reichle and
Jim Ruggeri deserve extra thanks for research assistance. Finally, I appreciate the interest and
efforts of the editors and staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review, who disrupted their regular editorial
schedule and put in long hours to get this review into print.
1. See L. YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRE'T THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE
ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM (1989) [hereinafter REFORM AND REGRET]. Yackle is Professor of Law at
Boston University School of Law. My visiting appointment at Alabama was a function in part of
Yackle's decision to visit at Boston University that year. Yackle's works in the area of habeas
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I returned to Alabama in August of that year to take up my faculty
position. My first night in Alabama I was invited to dinner at the associate dean's house. During dinner the dean's husband talked at some
length about the civil rights and prisoner litigation in which he was involved. I recall interrupting at one point in the conversation to ask
whether I could spend some time observing those matters. I was told
that in Alabama one did not come to observe, but I was welcome to
participate if I so chose. I did, and thus learned about civil rights litigation at the side of one of the great lawyers I have known, a moving force
in the Alabama prison litigation, Ralph Knowles.
Although I do not know for certain, it undoubtedly was an encounter of this nature that put Larry Yackle in the position to tell his insider's story of the Alabama prison litigation. Yackle writes as an
observer, with a certain amount of distance and neutrality. Yet he tells
us from the outset that his role was more than that. He "advised" the
prisoners' lawyers on legal issues, he acted as legal advisor to a team of
psychologists charged with classifying inmates, and on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union of Alabama, he argued before the Alabama Supreme Court challenging the state attorney general's interpretation of state sentencing laws. 2 But primarily-and perhaps most
importantly-Yackle monitored the prison cases "for a decade-in conversations over dinner, strategy sessions in lawyers' offices and, occasionally, formal proceedings in court."'
From this vantage point, Yackle offers us a story of, in his words,
"a struggle for social reform."'4 For over a decade a team of lawyers
worked to change the nature of Alabama's penal system. Reform and
Regret is Yackle's story of that struggle, told in meticulous detail, perceptively, and with the insight that comes only from being on the
inside.
Reform and Regret, however, is much more than a story about the
prison litigation. It is a story of how the State of Alabama-or at least
corpus include his excellent treatise, see L. YACKLE, POSTCONvIcTION REMEDIES (1981 & Supp.

1988), as well as several articles, see Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991
(1985); Yackle, The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IowA L. REV. 609
(1983); Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return
to First Principles, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393 (1983). There was more than a little irony in my first
meeting with Yackle, and our discussion of habeas corpus. My first piece of scholarship also was in
the area of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, see Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L.
REV. 247 (1988), and I remain indebted to Larry Yackle for his wise counsel regarding that piece,
and my subsequent scholarship in the field of federal jurisdiction.
2. See REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at v-vi.
3. Id. at v.
4. Id. For another personal, valuable account of the prison litigation, see Knowles, A Lawyer
Looks Back at 16 Years with Case: Monitoring Committee on Prisons in Alabama Folds; Court
Gives Up Jurisdiction,J. NAT'L PRISON PROJECT, Summer 1989, at 1.
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many of its public institutions-was run for a generation. It is a story of
how one judge, and ranks of committed lawyers and public citizens,
could use the courts to make policy in a state where elected officials
lacked the courage or foresight to make difficult decisions. It is a story
of when courts turn from dispute resolution to governance. 5
Scholars have been fascinated with, and preoccupied by, the concept of "public law" litigation for the last ten to fifteen years. Although
defined in different ways by each commentator, public law litigation
generally is seen as a departure from the "traditional" model of litigation, in which judges are passive, neutral decision makers, resolving discrete disputes brought to them by individual parties. 7 Public law
litigation bears little relation to this traditional model. Judges are
proactive, disputes are about far-ranging policy matters, and the parties
generally are large classes-not uncommonly a class of individuals versus the government.'
The difference that ultimately proved telling between "traditional"
and "public law" litigation, however, was in the nature of the decrees
issued and the process of enforcing those decrees. The decree generally
ends the contest in traditional litigation: money damages are preferred
over equitable relief, and satisfaction of the judgment commonly is a
one-time affair.9 Just the opposite is true in public law litigation: issuance of the decree likely begins a stage in the litigation at least as long
5. At least with regard to penal reform, the story is not unique to Alabama. Litigation on
behalf of prisoners, not majoritarian politics, has been the primary means of improving conditions
in many of the Nation's prisons. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982)
(appointing a special master to remedy the unconstitutional conditions in Tennessee's prison system); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (placing the Arkansas penitentiary system
under court review), afl'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
6. There is an extensive literature on the subject of public law litigation, and its attendant
difficulties. Some of the more important works include: Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981
Term-Foreword:Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, Public Law Litigation];Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, The Role of the Judge]; Diver, The Judge As Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43
(1979); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword:The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1979); Frug, The JudicialPower of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978); Nagel, Separationof
Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L Rsv. 374 (1982).
7. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge, supra note 6, at 1285-88; Resnik, supra note 6, at 38086.
8. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge, supra note 6, at 1284; Resnik, supra note 6, at 377-78.
9. See REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 107 (noting that "[i]n a more traditional lawsuit, such an order would have been the end, or nearly the end, of the litigation"); Chayes, The
Role of the Judge, supra note 6, at 1287 (asserting that "compensatory money damages was the
usual form of relief" and that "[p]rospective relief was highly exceptional"); cf. Fiss, supra note 6,
at 17 (stating that traditional litigation is triadic, with an impassive umpire whose function is to
observe what is right and declare that right be done).
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if not longer than the trial that preceded it. Equitable remedies are favored over money damages. Relief is wide ranging, typically requiring
effort by many layers of government. Implementation frequently intimately involves judges-usually federal judges-in the day-to-day operations of state government.' 0
Yackle's book comes at a particularly auspicious time, because in
two cases this Term the Supreme Court will address the breadth of remedial power available to federal judges in public law litigation. In
United States v. City of Yonkers" a federal district court held individual City Council members and the City in contempt, and imposed potentially bankrupting fines, for failing to implement a consent decree
requiring construction of low income housing in Yonkers, New York. In
Jenkins v. Missouri 2 the federal district court actually raised local
taxes in order to fund a wide-ranging school desegregation plan. Both
cases present the question of how a federal judge, faced with violations
of constitutional rights, may assure a remedy to persons whose rights
were violated when the remedy requires significant change in the way a
state or local government does business.
Reform and Regret is the story of individuals grappling with these
questions, not as a matter of constitutional law, but as a matter of dayto-day practical governance. The Alabama prison litigation is, as Yackle
recognizes, a fitting vehicle to examine the question of a federal court's
remedial power. These cases, and others like them in the State of Alabama, were the paradigm for those commentators enchanted by, or
troubled by, "public law" litigation in the early years." It is only proper
10. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge, supra note 6, at 1298 (arguing that a decree in public
law litigation "differs in almost every relevant characteristic from relief in the traditional model of

adjudication, not the least in that it is the centerpiece" (emphasis in original)); see also Chayes,
Public Law Litigation,supra note 6, at 46 (stating that the decree establishes "an ongoing regime
governing the institution that is the real target of the lawsuit"); Fiss, supra note 6, at 27-28 (asserting that in public law litigation, the remedial phase "has a beginning, maybe a middle, but no
end"); Nagel, supra note 6, at 661-64 (summarizing the broad use of the federal courts' equitable
powers and arguing against its constitutionality).
11. United States v. Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Spallone v. United
States, 58 U.S.L.W. 4103 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1990). The United States Supreme Court decided the Yonkers case as this Book Review was nearing completion. A closely divided Court overturned sanctions against the City Council members, holding essentially that until sanctions against the City
itself proved insufficient to achieve compliance, sanctions against individual City Council members
were inappropriate. See Yonkers, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4108. Previously the Court had refused to stay
the judgment of the Second Circuit that upheld sanctions against the City. See Spallone v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 14 (1988).
12. 672 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir.
1988), cert. granted in part, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989).
13. Many of the commentaries on public law litigation referred to the Alabama cases. See,
e.g., Diver, supra note 6, at 51 n.46; Nagel, supra note 6, at 661. In addition, Alabama prison
litigation was the focal point of at least one important article. See Robbins & Buser, Punitive
Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision
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to return to those cases ten or more years later, to see where the experiment has led.
What Yackle teaches us is that politics, not law, defines the
breadth of a federal judge's remedial power. What Yackle purports to
describe is litigation-a lawsuit-in which plaintiffs seek a remedy for
constitutional violations by the State. But what Yackle knows, and is
astute in presenting, is that the Alabama prison litigation was not a
typical lawsuit. Rather, what Yackle observed for over a decade was the
"real government of Alabama" at work. 14 And what the real government
could accomplish ultimately was measured, not by legal principles, but
by politics.
II.

THE REAL GOVERNMENT OF ALABAMA

A.

The Policy Problem

The Alabama penal institutions were in deplorable condition."
Yackle's description of life in the prisons is bound to be disconcerting
to anyone of average sensibilities. Prisons were overcrowded to the
point of bursting."6 Beds were so close one could not walk between
them, and prisoners slept on the floors, in showers, in halls, sometimes
with their faces near overflowing toilets. 17 The institutions were filthy
and overrun with vermin.' Prisoners often had little or no hygiene
products, or utensils with which to eat.'9 Violence was rampant: prisoners were sexually abused, wounded, or killed on a regular basis, and
even the guards would not enter the dormitories at night.20 These were
of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN L. REv. 893 (1977); see
also Resnik, supra note 6, at 386 (developing a model of public law litigation based on a "thinly
fictionalized amalgam" of several cases including Judge Johnson's mental hospital litigation).
14. The idea for my play on the "real government of Alabama" comes from the frequent
reference in the national media to Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., who presided over the prison
cases, as the "real governor of Alabama." See Brill, The Real Governor of Alabama, NEW YORK,
Apr. 26, 1976, at 37; The Real Governor, TIME, Jan. 26, 1976, at 65; see also REFORM AND REGRET,
supra note 1, at 15-16.
15. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 322-28 (M.D. Ala. 1976), afl'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.
781 (1978).
16. REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 65, 84, 90-91; see also Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 32223.
17. REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 87; see also Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 323.
18. R-FORM AND RWrPrT, supra nn'e 1. at 87: see also Pigh. 406 F. Supr. at 323.
19. REFORM AND REG.LT, supra note 1, at 87; see also Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 323.
20. REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 45-46, 80-83; see also Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 324-25.
One of the most gripping tales at trial was of a young, "mentally-retarded" inmate who was raped
on his first day in prison, beaten by inmates, and threatened with hanging. The inmate informed
an assistant warden of the rape:
[Question]: Did you ever talk to the assistant warden out there about this?
[Answer]: Yes, sir ....
He made a sarcastic question to me. He asked me did they get a little
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human warehouses, where convicted prisoners were locked up for the
period provided by law and forgotten.
Although filed as discrete lawsuits, Pugh v. Locke 21 and James v.
Wallace22 became the vehicles for systemwide penal reform in Alabama. 23 The judge handpicked the lawyers to handle the cases. The
lawyers understood the judge would welcome expansion of the individual complaints into a far-reaching examination of the conditions in Alabama prisons.2 4 Pugh's lawyer convinced him to drop his money
damages claim and to turn it into a class action. 25 From the start the
attorneys assembled public interest groups willing to lend support,
gathered experts to bolster their cases, and studied legal theories calculated not simply to win their individual clients' cases, but to provide
the basis for wide-ranging relief on behalf of all prisoners against the
State of Alabama. Ultimately, then, Pugh and James-along with the
predecessor case Newman v. State-were but references to policy
projects designed to improve the conditions in Alabama's prisons.2 6
pussy .... I didn't know what else to say to him but yes. And then he said there is nothing I
can do ....

REFORM AND REGRET,supra note 1, at 83.
21. 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), afl'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th
Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
Newman v. Ala22. James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub noma.
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
bama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub noma.
23. The two cases that ultimately became the prison litigation were filed by inmates. "The
complaint in Pugh, hammered out on an old prison typewriter, described an assault at the hands
of other prisoners, not state authorities." REFORM AND REGPT, supra note 1, at 51. Yet Pugh
blamed prison officials, and sought not only money damages, but an injunction establishing standards for inmate treatment. See id.; see also Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 321-22. James was the son of a
black sharecropper, in and out of prison much of his life. He filed a complaint challenging the
prison system's inadequate medical treatment and rehabilitation efforts. See REFORM AND REGRET,
supra note 1, at 54; see also James, 406 F. Supp. at 322.
24. This expansion was not unprecedented for a case before Judge Johnson. Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afl'd in part, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975), a case challenging the lack of medical care in the prisons, began similarly. See
REFORM AND REGRET,supra note 1, at 30-31.

25. REFORM

AND REGRET,supra

note 1, at 51-52.

26. Newman was directed at the quality of medical care in the institutions. Id. at 40. Pugh
was a version of the "right to protection" cases. Pugh's lawyers argued that the right to protection
included a right to be free from any punishment beyond detention simpliciter. Thus, cellblocks
must be maintained in a manner to ensure they are free from violence. Id. at 53-54. James was the
most ambitious of the three cases. although the lawyers rejected as unlikely to succeed a strategy.:
that asserted a "right to rehabilitation," they did argue the State could not maintain prisons in a
manner that "dehabilitated" prisoners trying to rehabilitate themselves. The James complaint alleged that the conditions in the Alabama penitentiaries constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth amendment, and that to remedy the violation the State not only must
reduce overcrowding and remedy intolerable conditions in the prisons, but must provide basic educational, vocational, and other beneficial programs for the prisoners. Id. at 55-59.
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B.

The "Governor"

Frank M. Johnson, Jr. had been on the federal district bench for
almost twenty years at the time he presided over the prison cases. In
that time he had desegregated Alabama's schools and numerous of its
public institutions, and had heard most of the key civil rights cases in
the State.2 7 Nor were the prisons Johnson's first attempt at institutional reform. In Wyatt v. Stickney 8 Johnson undertook to reform the
State's mental institutions. In Newman2 9 he addressed the question of

prison medical care.
Johnson was not one to avoid taking on responsibility. His bold
decisions on many fronts, especially civil rights, had made him for a
time a pariah in his home state while catapulting him to national fame.
As Yackle tells us early on, "More than one observer asked rhetorically
whether Johnson was not the 'real governor' of Alabama."30 Indeed, it is
unlikely the prison cases would have become vehicles for institutional
change had they not been heard by Johnson."
Moreover, Johnson was not unaware of the role he consistently was
called upon to play in Alabama government. As he frequently recounted, Johnson felt action on his part was demanded by the "Alabama Punting Syndrome," in which state officials became the subject of
judicial decrees only because of their unwillingness to take responsibility upon themselves.3 2 Thus, Johnson saw himself as filling a vacuum in
27. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (reforming Alabama's mental institutions), enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.
1971), aff'd in part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (prohibiting
interference with the Selma-to-Montgomery "Freedom March"); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of
Educ., 221 F. Supp. 297 (M.D. Ala. 1963) (desegregating Macon County, Alabama schools), supplemented by 221 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964); United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D.
Ala. 1961) (instigating voting rights reform), aff'd, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962);
United States v. U.S. Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala. 1961)
(enjoining interference with the "freedom rides"). Yackle says it best: "Frank Johnson was no
ordinary judge." REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 14. There is a wealth of literature about
Judge Johnson, much of it cited by Yackle. Two of my favorite books about Judge Johnson are T.
YARBROUGH, JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA
FRANK JOHNSON, JR., A BIOGRAPHY (1978).

(1981) and R. KENNEDY,

JUDGE

28. 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F.
Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
29. Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); see supra note 24.

30.

REFORM AND REGRET,

supra note 1, at 15; see supra note 14.

31. See REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 60-61 (showing that the National Prison Project joined the prison cases in part because the identity of the judge showed promise for wideranging reform); see also infra Part If(C) (describing the actions Johnson took in appointing lawyers and defining the scope of litigation).
32. Yackle reports that Judge Johnson drew the phrase "Alabama Punting Syndrome" from
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leadership.
Despite the obviousness of his activist role, Johnson held a more
modest view of his own work. Johnson claimed all his civil rights decisions were "easy," and that he just applied the law as he found it.33 Yet

Yackle tells us at one point that "[Johnson] had ample evidence from
which to make findings of fact, but he lacked judicial precedents on
which to rest his legal conclusion that the facts established a constitutional violation.

'34

Moreover, Johnson often tried to implement his de-

crees not through forceful judicial command, but by returning matters
to state officials in the hope they would recognize their responsibility,
thus avoiding the over-intrusive exercise of judicial power.3 5 There is,
therefore, a certain divergence between Johnson's deeds and his view of
those deeds, a divergence one wishes Yackle had pursued more
vigorously.
The solution likely lies in the fact that Johnson had a keen political
sense, perhaps the keenest in Alabama. He knew well his font of authority rested in the Constitution, but he knew equally well that without state cooperation he could not get the job done. Thus, he proceeded
by measure, scaling back goals to require only what was attainable, and
disclaiming responsibility for anything but what was foisted upon him
by his oath of office and abandoned by others. All the while he maintained that he merely was enforcing the Constitution's clear
requirements.
C. The Cabinet
One of the most telling pieces of evidence of Johnson's skill at governance was the people he chose to pursue prison reform with him.
Johnson called in lawyers of the highest calibre and dedication. He assembled people he trusted to move the prison matter in the direction of
the "growing literature on [Johnson's] work." See REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1,'at 16; see
also McCormack, The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdictionand the Prisoner Complaint
Caseload, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 523, 536 (referring to the Alabama Federal Intervention Syndrome).
Johnson has referred to the concept in a number of pieces he has written concerning public law
litigation and the role of the judiciary. See, e.g., Johnson, The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 271 (1981); Johnson, In Defcnse of Judicial Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901 (1979); Johnson, The Alabama Punting Syndrome, JUDGE'S J., Spring 1979, at 4, 6
[hereinafter Johnson, The Alabama Punting Syndrome].
33. REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 16.
34. Id. at 38. Johnson essentially found violations of constitutional rights based on the facts,
despite the absence of precedents to support his decision. Thus, the cases perhaps were "easy" on
the facts, but Johnson's work nonetheless was pathbreaking.
35. Id. at 17-18; see also Johnson, The Alabama Punting Syndrome, supra note 32. Judge
Johnson has stated that he would have been happy to give the responsibility back to the elected
officials and "look[s] forward to the day when all state officials willingly accept the responsibility
to protect those basic human rights on which we agreed 200 years ago." Id. at 54.
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reform. Moreover, he drew upon people of stature in the community,
hoping they could, by example, convince others of the need for prison
reform.
A few examples suffice. To represent Pugh, Johnson chose Robert
Segall, a former law clerk and a lawyer at a prestigious firm." For
James, Johnson appointed George Peach Taylor, a professor at the University of Alabama, and a political moderate, who nonetheless possessed
extensive civil rights experience.3 7 Perhaps the most interesting appointment Johnson made was the amicus assignment he gave Ira DeMent. DeMent was the United States Attorney for the Middle District
of Alabama."8 One of Johnson's frequent tactics was to appoint the
United States as amicus or intervenor in a large scale litigation, thus
gaining the resources of the United States government. While Yackle
recognizes the novelty of this approach, he explains, "[T]hese [Justice
Department] lawyers did not represent adversaries. . . at all; they appeared for the United States which, in Johnson's mind, meant they represented the public interest."3 9
These players drew in more staff and assistance. The ACLU's National Prison Project and its director, Al Bronstein, pledged its resources.40 The Alabama ACLU and its director, Steve Suitts, joined in.4 1
Ralph Knowles, a prominent Tuscaloosa attorney, and later associate
director of the prison project, coordinated much of the litigation. 42 Experts were drafted from numerous places, including the University of
Alabama's Center for Correctional Psychology. 43
In short, this litigation was no ordinary adversary contest. It was a
broadside attack on a faltering state institution. Johnson-the chief executive-recognized the problem and the gravity of correcting it. He
thus turned to the best "staff" he could assemble and instructed them
to proceed.
36.

REFORM AND REGR T, supra note 1, at 51.
37. Id. at 54. Taylor was one of the founders of Birmingham's Young Men's Business Club,
which formed during the Birmingham boycott in 1963, and ultimately negotiated a settlement with

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Id.
38. REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 23; see also id. at 69-70 (discussing DeMent's
involvement in the litigation).

39. Id. at 42.
40. The National Prison Project and the United States ultimately were appointed amici curiae by the court, with all the rights and privileges of parties. Id. at 64, 268 n.23.
41. Id. at 55-56, 58-60.
42. See generally id. at 58-78. John Carroll, formerly Director of the Southern Poverty Law
Center, and now a United States Magistrate in Montgomery, Alabama, also did "yeoman service"

on behalf of the plaintiffs. Knowles, supra note 4, at 5 n.12; see also REFORM
note 1, at 178, 208-20, 228-36, 244-52.
43. REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 73.

AND REGRET,

supra
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D. Making Public Policy
1.

The "Governor" Sets the Tone

Disagreement existed among the "staff" as to what the State's penal policy should be. Some felt that all they could hope to achieve was
to clean up conditions in the prisons. Others hoped for a full-scale assault on penal policy, particularly the policy of warehousing convicts.
There was also a debate at the cabinet level about whether to press for
'44
a policy that included a genuine "right to rehabilitation."
The "Governor" early on made his views clear for the litigation. 5
He would not interfere with basic penal policy. Any such change in policy would be up to other state officials. Rather, the goal of this process
would be assuring "minimal decency" in prison conditions.4 6 Johnson,
however, did agree to pursue a "self-rehabilitation" approach-if staff
could demonstrate that prison conditions needed changing to permit
prisoners to move along their own rehabilitation, those changes might
be implemented.4 7
2.

Assembling Data

In ordinary litigation, both sides conduct discovery, developing
their own cases and learning of the other side's proof. By Yackle's telling, this case developed quite differently. Plaintiffs' lawyers did all of
the things lawyers generally would do to ready themselves for trial,
which also happened to be what a good administrative staff would do in
developing public policy. They made a record of the problems. They
retained experts to determine which solutions were required. They consulted national guidelines and standards from other jurisdictions. They
found witnesses with sympathetic, indeed startling, stories.4 8
The State's lawyers, by Yackle's accounts, did almost nothing.
They responded to plaintiffs' requests. They even stipulated to much of
the plaintiffs' case. But they did not interview the plaintiffs' experts,
nor does it appear they did much in the way of developing their own
case.

49

44. On the issue of whether to pursue a "right to rehabilitation" claim, see id. at 55-61.
45. In response to a motion to dismiss filed by the State, Judge Johnson issued an order
denying the motion and explaining which claims he felt the plaintiffs could prove. Id. at 62-63.
"This opinion, Johnson's first in either Pugh or James, was essentially a blueprint. [Matthew]
Myers [of the Prison Project] put it succinctly: 'As we all agreed, Johnson has provided us with a
basic outline which we would be wise to follow.' That is precisely what the judge intended." Id. at
62.
46. Id. at 62.
47. Id. at 63.
48. For a discussion of discovery and trial preparation, see id. at 71-78.
49. Id. at 71, 77-78; see also id. at 61 (noting that "[a]s the lawyers for the prisoners were
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State officials, the lawyers' ostensible clients, were more active.
They played their case to the media, and in a manner not always inconsistent with the policy approach being developed by the plaintiffs' lawyers. State officials began to develop the theme that would become
central to the problem: the legislature failed to provide enough money
to run the prisons properly. State officials knew they had an alarming
problem but believed it was the result of underfunding, not poor
administration.5
3.

Presenting the Evidence

Rather than a harsh adversary testing, trial also proved more consistent with presentation of the gathered information to the chief executive for ultimate decision. Many of the facts were stipulated. The
plaintiffs' fact witnesses told gripping tales of the horrible conditions,
violence, and sexual abuse in the prisons. Plaintiffs' experts critiqued
the Alabama prisons, making the case that Alabama fell far short of
decent conditions by whatever standard one used.5 '
4. Policy Decision
At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the State began to present its
own witnesses. When it became clear that even the State's witnesses
were assisting the plaintiffs' case, however, the State reached a dramatic decision: counsel for the State stood up in court and conceded
that the conditions in the prisons violated constitutional norms.2 Thus,
on the evidence gathered by staff, the only issue was the extent of the
relief to be accorded, or, stated differently, the manner in which the
State would begin to rehabilitate its penal system.53
What followed was a decree of great detail, specifying exactly what
the conditions of confinement would be in the Alabama prisons. Labeled "Minimum Constitutional Standards for Inmates of Alabama Penal System," this document was a blueprint for designing, modifying,
and operating prisons. The order specified, among many other things:
cell size, standards for cleanliness, the provision of certain personal hyorganizing, the defense crept along seemingly without appreciation for what plaintiffs' counsel

were planning").
50. See id. at 64-67 (describing the state officials' response to the litigation).
51. For a description of the trial proceedings, see id. at 79-92.
52. For a discussion of the State's concession, see id. at 92-94.
53. From the bench, or shortly after trial, Johnson made several decisions that required some
immediate action. He ordered the doghouse-the punishment cells at Draper Correctional
Center-closed immediately. The next day, in a joint order with another federal judge also hearing
prison matters, Alabama was told not to accept any additional prisoners into the system until the
population had been reduced to design capacity. Id. at 94-95.
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giene products, and the serving of a specific number of meals selected
from a menu prepared by a licensed dietician. The order set inmate and
staff levels, and in one particular deemed key by the prisoners' lawyers
and experts, ordered the defendants to contract with the University of
Alabama Department of Correctional Psychology to develop jointly a
plan for classifying inmates. Finally, the order provided specific dates
for compliance."
Johnson's decree in the prison cases received great attention from
commentators, and it is regrettable Yackle did not spend more time
discussing it. For one thing, the order was a departure from Johnson's
usual executive style. In cases of this nature Johnson ordinarily proceeded by a two-step process, first giving the defendants time to develop standards to comply with the constitutional ruling, and then
drafting his own specific standards if the defendant failed to do a satisfactory job. 5 Johnson jumped right to this second step in the prison
cases.
What is even more interesting about the decree, however, is that
despite Johnson's stated decision not to disturb fundamental penal policy and only to specify conditions of confinement, the actual impact of
his order may have had just the opposite effect. As Yackle acknowledges, the impact of the order was tremeldous: estimates were that
compliance would cost millions of dollars. 6 Yet the impact of this financial burden was such that the State indeed might have to change
penal policy-not as a result of a direct judicial order to do so, but as a
consequence of Johnson's ostensibly more limited order to reduce population and improve conditions. Although the cost of the order, and its
potential for altering penal policy, surface consistently throughout the
remainder of the book, Yackle never treats this issue directly.
Once the order was handed down, policy was set. Although the order was just the beginning, and implementation was a rocky road
ahead, the standards established in the order endured as policy until
the end, when it became clear everyone had lost the heart or energy to
try any longer to enforce them.
54. For a full reporting of the order, see Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 331-32 (M.D. Ala.
1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom.
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). Yackle's discussion of the order appears in REFORM AND
REGRET, supra note 1, at 100-07. The plaintiffs' lawyers hoped classification would reveal that
many prisoners did not require incarceration in the traditional prison environment.

55.

REFORM AND REGRET,

56.

Defense counsel suggested that "whopping sums of money" would be necessary. Id. at

supra note 1, at 16-18.

BOOK REVIEW

1990]
E.

Implementing Public Policy

1. The Administrative Agencies
One of the intractable problems in public law litigation is implementation of the decree. Implementation in cases such as the prison
litigation poses particular difficulty because of the elaborate nature of
the relief required. The court and the parties must search for an enforcement mechanism calculated to ensure compliance with the decree.
Johnson's choice of a means of implementation underscored the
"governance" nature of the prison litigation. The prison lawyers asked
the court to appoint a compliance master, or, in the alternative, a receiver. The State maintained its officials were competent to perform the
task. Johnson "steered an independent course, '57 relying on "administrative agencies" to superintend the prison system.
Primary enforcement responsibility was vested in a Human Rights
Commission (HRC).5 8 Establishment of such commissions was a familiar tactic employed by Johnson. Prominent citizens from around the
State composed the HRC; the chair was Rod Nachman, a former president of the Alabama Bar. The hope for the HRC was that its prominent
membership could "galvanize" state support for the political work of
reforming the prisons. 59 In part this hope proved true, for long after the
HRC was disbanded, Nachman continued to play a key role in prison
reform.6 0
At a later point in the litigation, Johnson's choice of agencies"' to
monitor implementation ran into difficulty with the appellate courts.2
Rebuke by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, did not lead
Johnson to more traditional means of implementation. If anything,
what followed was even more novel and politically savvy. At some point
after the Fifth Circuit rendered its decision on the HRC, Alabama had
57. Id. at 103.
58. Id. at 103-04.
59. Id. at 110-11.
60. As counsel to Governor Fob James, Nachman led the negotiations that resulted in formation of the Implementation Committee, which later monitored prison compliance. Id. at 227-37; see
infra note 64 and accompanying text.
61. The other agency was the University of Alabama's Department of Correctional Psychology. The Department was charged with developing a system for the classification of inmates. Ultimately, the Department took primary responsibility for this task. See REFORM AND REGRET, supra
note 1, at 138-61.
62. The Fifth Circuit determined on appeal that the HRC was an impermissible intrusion
into the governance of the State. See Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288-90 (5th Cir. 1977),
rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). By the time of the appeal friction
between the State and the University of Alabama's Department of Correctional Psychology, and
challenges to the latter's authority, had reached an intolerable level, but the Department largely

was done with itswork anyway and no longer was working the prisons. See
supra note 1, at 162-63.

REFORM AND REGRET,
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a new governor, Fob James. James asked Johnson to appoint him as
"receiver" for the prisons, thereby divesting the Department of Corrections of responsibility. Johnson acceded, but only after James stated
explicitly that the prisons were not in compliance with the original order, and that James would do all he could to bring them into compliance.6 s Moreover, Johnson required that the leaders of each house of
the legislature and the attorney general join in signing the statement.
When he received these assurances, Johnson appointed James as receiver, thus attempting to assure compliance through "regular" political
processes."
2. Mired in Bureaucracy
In three agonizing chapters Yackle tells of the political maneuvering and legal skirmishing that constituted an attempt to enforce the
prison decree.65 Commissioners came and went. Prison officials resented
the intrusion of monitoring agencies. The legislature took the occasional
step of assisting compliance, such as altering the "good time" credit
law, but refused to allocate what the system really needed, an infusion
of funds. 6 The only time money was allocated it was to build new prisons, a strategy that could not hope to succeed. Meanwhile, politicians
at the top of Alabama's political organization complained about pampering prisoners, even while their subordinates recognized the prison
system was inserious trouble.6 "
63. REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 182.
64. Id. at 182-83. Even this arrangement proved temporary. at the end of James's term he
chose not to run again and was succeeded by George Wallace. Once again, however, an agency was
formed to monitor compliance. This time it was an Implementation Committee, with four members appointed by the two parties to the litigation. Id. at 227-37. Most remarkably, one of the
plaintiffs' lawyers, Ralph Knowles, sat on the committee in order to monitor compliance. See id. at
237-38 (noting that "Ralph Knowles[] would turn a legal arabesque," moving from "indefatigable
advocate for prison inmates . . .into an arm of the federal court"). It was this "agency" that
remained in charge of ensuring compliance until the litigation was terminated.
65. The three chapters aptly are entitled "Intransigence," "Recalcitrance," and "D6jA Vu."
See id. at 108-86.
66. Even as the legislature passed legislation calculated to help the prison situation, it also
passed legislation that exacerbated the situation, such as Alabama's Habitual Felony Offender Act,
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1975).

67. As a practical matter it is unlikely that a strategy based on building new prisons can
succeed. Prison populations are outgrowing society's ability to build enough prisons to contain
them. This dilemma is a national problem currently faced by my own state. See Progress Comes
Slowly on State's Prison Problem, Tennessean, Dec. 29, 1989, at 10A, col. 1 (editorial describing
state's request to double-cell prisoners because it cannot find space to house burgeoning population); U.S. MarshalsMeeting to Discuss the Overcrowding in Prisons,N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at
12, col. 1 (nat'l ed.) (reporting that the federal prison population is expected to double in the next
five years). As a matter of construction, prisons probably could be built quickly enough to contain
prison populations: the problem is taxpayer approval of the funds to do so.
68. George Wallace, Johnson's nemesis, accused Judge Johnson of prescribing a "hotel atmo-
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In general, scant improvement was made.6 9 Johnson's order forbade
accepting additional prisoners from the jails until the population of the
prison system was reduced to "design capacity." Insufficient strides
were made in this direction, and prisoners backed up into the jails.
Johnson refused to certify a class action on behalf of all jail prisoners,
but individual actions on behalf of various jail populations led to orders
limiting the capacity of those jails. Running Alabama's penal system
became a giant game of shuttling inmates from one facility to another
70
across the State, wherever there was available space.
In the absence of a legislature willing to consider either a change in
fundamental penal policy or funding necessary to improve Alabama's
prisons, only one tactic seemed to hold any promise for bringing the
system into compliance. That tactic was early release of the less-dangerous prisoners from the system to make room for the burgeoning population of the jails. Matters became so bad in the prisons that even the
Commissioner and Board of Corrections privately were willing to agree
to a release, on one condition: that Johnson order the release, sparing
them the political heat.71
Johnson demurred in the strongest of terms. "'Mr. Knowles,' he
said firmly, 'I just want to make one thing clear. It will be a long time
before this court will order the release of duly convicted felons from
prisons in the State of Alabama.' ,,72 Johnson's reasons for this stance
are unclear, and this matter, regrettably, is one Yackle did not pursue.
At any rate, it was a key moment in the implementation stage, because
it left the prisoners' lawyers no choice but to go back to court in a formal adversarial hearing-years after the original order-to prove noncompliance and seek further relief.
This compliance hearing was part and parcel of a process that essentially brought the administration of the prison system to a point of
"disintegration," although unfortunately it did little to improve condisphere and catering service" for prisoners, see REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 105, and said
he would rather discuss "the victims in their graves sleeping closer together than the prisoners,"
see id. at 122. See generally id. at 104-07 (reporting the rhetoric about pampering prisoners). As
for prison officials understanding that the system was in trouble, see id. at 177 (noting that the
Commissioner conceded noncompliance and acknowledged that the system could not be brought
into compliance without funding); id. at 175 (stating that the Commissioner and corrections board
agreed to the release of prisoners if the judge ordered it, because "there [was] no other solution").
69. Some advances were made, but many of these quickly were lost. For example, the Department of Correctional Psychology managed to get all the prisoners classified, a large step toward sane management of the prisons. Id. at 161. A year after the Department was forced to
withdraw from the prisons, however, any evidence of its presence was lost. Id. at 165.
70. For a discussion of the overcrowding backlog in the jails, see id. at 171-75.
71. Id. at 175.
72. Id. at 176.
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tions in the prisons.73 The prisoners' lawyers proved and Judge Johnson
acknowledged, that after years gone by the situation in the prisons was
"still critical."' 4 What was less clear was what could be done to solve
the problem.
Two events of tremendous significance during the course of compliance overshadowed the otherwise intractable problem of what to do
next. One-alluded to earlier-was that Fob James became governor
and entered into the agreement to be appointed receiver. Perhaps most
important, however, Frank Johnson was appointed to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Johnson's last order in the prison case was the denial
of a motion by prisoners' counsel to remove James as receiver. The
prison cases now would move to other hands.
F.

The New Administration and an End to Reform

Judge Robert Varner was in many ways the antithesis of Frank
Johnson. While Johnson was sympathetic to the claims of prisoners and
anxious to achieve reform, Varner was hostile to civil rights plaintiffs
generally. Yackle's assessment is that had Varner, rather than Johnson,
been on the bench when the original case was heard, "it is most unlikely
that . . . [the lawyers] would have developed their cases into major
class actions for the purpose of thoroughgoing reform . . . .
In what is one of the most telling parts of Yackle's story, however,
Varner-from a much more traditional view of judging than that of
Johnson-did the one thing Johnson would not. Faced with widespread
noncompliance, and believing fault rested with the legislature for failing
to provide funds, Varner did what he believed was necessary to force
the legislature's hand. He began the release of prisoners from the system.77 Moreover, he held the prison commissioner and state attorney
general in contempt and imposed large fines. 8
Had Johnson done the same at an earlier stage in the litigation it is
anyone's guess what would have happened. By 1981, however, it was too
late in the day for such a tactic to succeed. Varner set off a political
firestorm in Alabama.7 9 The appellate courts (reflecting the views of a
new Supreme Court, and a conservative United States Department of
Justice, which no longer was assisting the prisoners' lawyers) lost heart.
73.

Id. at 181 (concluding that "[t]he administration of the Alabama prison system was now

disintegrated").
74.

Id. at 178.

75. Id. at 185-86.
76. Id. at 187.
77. Id. at 198-200.
78. Id. at 245-47.

79. See id. at 212-13.
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First they criticized the release and said Varner should use more traditional remedies such as contempt.8 0 Then when Varner did so, the court

of appeals overturned the contempt order as well. 1 In essence, Varner
was left without tools to enforce the original decree.
Impetus toward ending the prison litigation might have come from
the United States Supreme Court, or from a perception by the court of
appeals as to the Supreme Court's direction. Traditionally, Supreme
Court decisions always counseled deference to state officials in running
prisons.82 ' Nonetheless, the Court plainly was troubled by the
"deplorable" conditions in many of the Nation's prisons, including Alabama's, and the Court displayed some sympathy with developing constitutional guidelines for prisons during this period. 3 Later decisions,
however, suggested a possible change in direction as deference to state
officials again became the Court's primary standard. 4
This change in direction by the Court ultimately put the skids on
the Alabama prison litigation. Based on what the court of appeals perceived to be changed standards, it held contempt sanctions in the Alabama prison cases to be inappropriate. Rather, Varner's task was to
consider whether the original decree required modification in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions, in order to determine whether Johnson
had not gone too far.85
Simultaneously, Alabama hired a new Commissioner, who took seriously the job of obtaining compliance with "new" constitutional standards. Several new prisons were built. Conditions did improve."
After remand to Varner following the striking of his contempt
sanctions, it seemed everyone knew reform was over. 7 There still was
80. See id. at 220-21; see also Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983).
81. REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 248-49; see Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513
(11th Cir. 1984).

82. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) (arguing that "[t]raditionally, federal
courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration"), overruled on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989).
83. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (affirming the responsibility of the

courts to scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual punishment, finding some older prisons in
"deplorable" and "sordid" conditions, and citing Pugh); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (affirming attorney's fees for prisoners' attorneys in Arkansas prison litigation and reciting particulars underlying its conclusion that prisoners in Arkansas endured "cruel and unusual"
punishment); Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405 (noting that "a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims").
84.

See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352 (upholding double-ceiling of inmates in an Ohio prison and

espousing a policy of deference to state officials); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding a
variety of practices in a New York pretrial detention center and deferring to state officials).
85. See Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1571 (11th Cir. 1984).
86.
87.

See REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 24-43.
See id. at 249 (concluding that "[t]he fate of the Pugh and James cases was now
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bickering over compliance, and the Implementation Committee stayed
in business for several more years. Within three months of the court of
appeals' decision, however, the parties would "recommend" to the court
that Pugh and Locke be dismissed. Compliance was deemed "sufficient," though there would be no statement that the prisons met constitutional standards or measured up to the original decree.88
Several factors thus contributed to bringing the litigation to an
end. Exhaustion in the face of continued political hostility certainly
played a part. Minimal conditions did improve. More importantly,
though, Varner was stripped of his remedy. Or perhaps the right just
changed.
III. THE POLITICS OF REMEDIES
A fundamental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that if
there is a right, and the right is violated, the law will accord a remedy.
If citation is needed, Marbury v. Madison 9 will suffice. Among its
many other holdings, Marbury stands for the proposition that "where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at
law, whenever that right is invaded."9
Yackle tells a story of a reform effort in which the right apparently
was not disputed, but the remedy nonetheless was not forthcoming.9 1 At
a time when the scope of federal judicial remedial authority is a matter
of some controversy, Yackle's story affords a unique insight into the
relationship between rights and remedies. By examining the tale Yackle
recounts, we learn what he apparently perceives: remedying rights is
not as simple as the frequent invocation of our fundamental tenet
would lead one to believe. Marbury's analysis of rights and remedies
affords a paradigm for examination of the problem.
sealed").
88. Id. at 250. For a description of the ultimate end of the litigation, including conclusion of
the Implementation Committee's work, see Knowles, supra note 4.
89. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a comprehensive discussion of Marbury, see Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKe L.J. 1.
90. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163; see also Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CH L. R.v. 443 (1989); Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 665
(1987).
Concededly, the law displays a certain ambivalence toward this "fundamental tenet." Relief
often is denied in cases in which a right ostensibly exists because of some doctrine such as sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
91. The remedy was not barred by any doctrine that traditionally might have proven problematic, such as standing or sovereign immunity.
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A.

Was There a Right That Was Violated?

Whether the prisoners' rights were violated is a question not necessarily easy to answer. The right proffered was the eighth amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Whether treatment
is "cruel and unusual" is a determination "necessarily imprecise and
indefinite.

'9 2

More than with many rights, determination of whether a

punishment is cruel and unusual involves an evaluation of contemporary standards as to what comports with fundamental decency and
human dignity.

3

Yackle describes the conditions in the prisons as "shocking" and
"debilitating.

94

By most accounts they were. Reading of prison condi-

tions is unpleasant enough: for most of us, living under such conditions
would be unthinkable.
But most of us are not required to live in prisons. Prisons are
populated by those who have flaunted society's rules and thus have subjected themselves to punishment. Although most of us could not conceive of living under the conditions Yackle describes, the question is
whether the conditions constituted unacceptable punishment. This
question was the one put to Judge Johnson.95
Fortunately, Johnson's task of resolving this question was made
somewhat easier because once confronted with the facts, the State's
representatives felt they could do nothing but concede that a right had
been violated. Indeed, this theme is persistent in Yackle's book: time
after time state officials responsible for the prisons themselves proclaimed conditions in the prisons unacceptable.9 7 It is of course true
these very same officials were leery of abdicating control over the prisons to a federal court. But in a certain sense even federal judicial intervention was welcome, for it held out the only hope for providing prison
officials with the resources they believed were necessary to run the
prisons."98

Was there a right that was violated? Yackle seems certain a violation occurred. Judge Johnson so held. The State apparently agreed; it
conceded the point and later signed a consent decree agreeing to rem92. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 361 (1981); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
93. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 299-300 (1987); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282
(1972).
94. See REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at v.
95. Accord Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (stating that "[c]onditions [of confinement] must not
involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment").
96. REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 93-94 (conceding at trial that "[ait this point the
Board of Corrections and Attorney General's office feels that a totality case has been made out").
97. Id. at 65-67, 93, 118.
98. Id. at 65, 175.
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edy the conditions. For the moment then, let us assume a right was
violated.
B.

Was There a Remedy to Which the Prisoners Were Entitled?

Still tracking Marbury, two issues must be addressed. First, what
was the nature of the relief applied for, and second, what was the power
of the court?
1. The Nature of the Relief
Johnson entered a sweeping decree. Commentators, even those supportive of public law litigation generally and reform of Alabama's prisons in particular, have been critical of the decree's breadth and
attention to detail.9 After all, how necessary is a licensed dietician to
assuring prison conditions do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment? Must an inmate have toothpaste? A toilet that flushes from
within the cell? Sixty, as opposed to fifty-five square feet?
In a sense Johnson was vulnerable on this point. Pugh and Locke
represented a departure from his usual way of doing business, which
would have been to give the state the first opportunity to shape the
decree. Then, if the state failed Johnson would have specified what was
necessary. 100 In this case Johnson moved right from the State's concession to fashioning the relief he believed appropriate.
On the other hand, there was nothing constitutionally inappropriate about what Johnson did. The State of Alabama conceded that it
was the "totality" of the conditions that constituted the constitutional
violation, and it was the totality of those conditions that Johnson addressed. Moreover-and again-the State as much as endorsed Johnson's remedy when it signed the consent decree. 101
2. The Power of the Court
This analysis brings us to the nub of the problem. If anything,
Yackle's story is about power. Yackle identifies as one of the most significant "milestones" in the prison litigation the shift of the case from
Judge Johnson to Judge Varner. As Yackle portrays it, the two men
represented two completely different approaches to the problem of enforcement: Johnson, the politician, relied on threats of coercion, negotiation, and compromise to see the decree was enforced; Varner relied
99. See Robbins & Buser, supra note 13, at 917. "In assessing Pugh's minimum standards,
it is immediately apparent that many lack specific constitutional foundation. Even as a policy
matter, the efficacy of the measures proposed is not clear." Id.
100. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
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instead on the more traditional tools of a judge.
a. The Power of Law
The termination of the prison litigation under the aegis of Judge
Varner demonstrates the limits of law. Despite the misgivings of prisoners' counsel about Varner, mirrored by Yackle, Judge Varner aggressively took on the task of enforcing Johnson's decree. Varner may not
have agreed with the relief granted, and may never have granted that
relief himself, but he took seriously the esteem of the judiciary: to have
a judicial decree and be unable to enforce it would be an unpardonable
state of affairs.10 Thus, Varner employed the tools of a judge to ensure
enforcement.
When enforcement was not forthcoming after hearings, negotiations, and judicial prodding, Varner drew upon his equitable power to
begin a release of prisoners deemed nondangerous and bring the prison
population within compliance limits. If population could not be brought
under control, the decree generally had no chance of implementation.
Moreover, Varner himself was savvy enough to recognize that releasing
the prisoners was the best way to generate political heat in the legislature to obtain the resources necessary for implementation.103
Although the release of prisoners created a public uproar, and ultimately may have succeeded in moving the legislature to action, the use
of this tool failed because the judiciary itself lost heart. When the release issue was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, that court held release
was an invalid use of the district court's equity power. Rather, the court
of appeals held that the district judge must instead use "traditional"
equity tools, such as contempt, with its concomitants of fines and
10 4
imprisonment.

102. At one of the compliance hearings before him, Judge Varner said:
My problem is this: If a Judge orders something that can't be done he is making the
Court look bad. I have already done that in this case. I don't want it to look any worse than it
has gotten . . . I have got people before me here today who are nearly all in contempt of
court now ....
I have a duty to protect anybody whose constitutional rights are violated.
REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 211.

103. Id. at 206. Varner's sense of how to prod legislative action, and his use of traditional
judicial techniques toward this end, demonstrates that the law-politics dichotomy is inaccurate to
a certain extent, and is useful only to paint two paradigmatic models. Dichotomies in general are
useful only in this way. One of the great shortcomings of legal analysis is confusing the usefulness
of a dichotomy to describe and analyze an idealized problem with the use of dichotomies as descriptive of reality.
104. Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983).
There was nothing legally compelling about Judge Tjoflat's opinion for the Eleventh Circuit. It
lacked citation to any precedent in support of its holding that contempt was the only permissible
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At this point Judge Varner was left with no arrows in his quiver
outside the "traditional" sanctions of fines and imprisonment for contempt. After another period of recalcitrance, Judge Varner finally fired
these arrows. He held both Alabama's attorney general and prison commissioner in contempt. Steep fines were imposed, based upon the number of prisoners held over design capacity each day.105
Again it is difficult to say if this use of traditional remedies would
have succeeded, for again the appellate court backed down. The court
of appeals held that the commissioner could not be fined because he
exercised due diligence and did all he could to cut the prison population.106 Contempt against the attorney general also was inappropriate,
because he lacked authority to release prisoners,07 although the court
suggested he might be susceptible to a fine because he had acted in a
manner calculated to thwart compliance with the judicial decree. 0
Even in that case, however, fines were improper. Because the Supreme
Court had in the interim between the original decree and the contempt
proceeding handed down decisions on the issue of the constitutional
"totality" of prison conditions, 109 contempt was inappropriate without a
new hearing below as to whether conditions in the Alabama prisons met
those standards set by the Supreme Court."1 0
This reversal of sanctions was the final straw. It became clear to
lawyers on both sides, and to the judge, that the Eleventh Circuit was
sanction and ignored citation to case law that might have justified such broad relief as releasing
prisoners. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737-38 (1974); Swann v. Board of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). Indeed, tht
Eleventh Circuit's decision on relief itself may have been motivated more by a sense of politics
than law, the very same political sense that led Judge Johnson to refrain in the first instance from
releasing prisoners.
105. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
106. See Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1525 (11th Cir. 1984).
107. Id. at 1528.
108. Id. at 1528-29.
109. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
110. See Graddick, 740 F.2d at 1520-21; see also REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 22021. Again, it is unclear why the Eleventh Circuit held as it did. First, there was nothing legally
compelling about the Eleventh Circuit's decision that the standards in Rhodes and Bell should
govern rather than the original decree. Although an injunction may be voided if standards change
after it is put in effect, it also is acceptable to hold parties to their agreement as embodied in a
consent decree. The Second Circuit so held in Yonkers, see United States v. City of Yonkers, 856
F.2d 444, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Spallone v. United States, 58
U.S.L.W. 4103 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1990), and on that issue the Supreme Court denied certiorari, see
Yonkers, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989). Second, Rhodes and Bell did not necessarily have any impact on
the Alabama case-Bell was about conditions of confinement for as yet unconvicted prisoners, and
Rhodes was only about double-bunking in a prison that was almost a model of acceptable conditions. Indeed, the Rhodes court cited Alabama as an example of intolerable conditions in some
prisons, in contrast to the conditions in the Ohio prison at issue in Rhodes. See Rhodes, 452 U.S.
at 352 n.17. Thus, Rhodes could have been read as justifying widespread relief to remedy conditions in Alabama's prisons.
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unprepared to put its weight behind enforcement of the original decree.
No one had the energy to start from the beginning under new standards. The litigation was settled, essentially confirming the constitutionality of conditions as they then stood.1 11
Although Yackle is unclear why everyone lost heart, reading between the lines of his story suggests why enforcement of the original
decree by traditional legal tools was bound to fall. Fundamentally
changing the nature of an institution such as a state's prisons is hefty
work. It requires changes in policy and administration, as well as enormous resources. A court simply cannot fulfill all of these roles.
Implementing wide-ranging government policy typically requires
three branches of government acting in concert; a court, at best, generally can be only two. This lesson is the one Yackle offers of the prison
litigation. A court can be a court, of course. And, a court can act as an
executive, wresting control from elected officials and decreeing policy.
But implementing the kind of changes suggested by Johnson's decree
required vast amounts of money, and for that a legislature is needed. It
is next to impossible for a court to be a legislature.' 12
It was money, ultimately, that seems to have foiled implementation
of the original decree. Yackle continually points to the lack of resources
as standing in the way of significant change."" It is not impossible for a
court to obtain the necessary resources to fund sweeping change, but it
requires an exercise of judicial authority as likely to provoke a constitutional crisis as succeed.
111. REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 249-50.
112. When a court commands not only judicial power and executive power, but also the
power of the purse, one might argue there is an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. See Frug, supra note 6, at 733; Nagel, supra note 6, at 710-11. In Jenkins v.
Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted in part, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989), the Eighth
Circuit rejected such a separation of powers argument, holding that separation of powers was a
doctrine limiting only the authority of courts vis a vis the national government, not the authority
of courts over state governments. See Jenkins, 855 F.2d at 1310. With regard to state governments,
federalism and comity were the limiting principles, see id. at 1310, and neither barred the order
issued in that case, see id. at 1313 (stating that because of the supremacy clause, "state law limitations cannot hinder a district court from remedying constitutional violations").
Combination of the functions of all three branches of government in one body is not unknown
at the federal level. Administrative agencies frequently combine all three functions. The constitutionality of administrative agencies nonetheless is preserved, at least in part, by subsequent federal
judicial review, generally in the appellate courts. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852-54 (1986) (upholding jurisdiction of CFTC over common-law counterclaims because CFTC orders are subject to judicial review); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68
(D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (upholding a broad delegation to the agency "because there
is court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits"),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). The same, however, holds true of the orders of a federal district
court.
113. See, e.g., REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at vi, 91-92, 108.
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This Term, in Jenkins v. Missouri 14 the Supreme Court will address the specific question of whether a court may usurp the legislative
function of coming up with funds to implement constitutional remedies.
Should the Supreme Court hold that a court never may order an increase of taxes or exercise similar authority to obtain funding, Yackle's
book suggests that much public law litigation-at least under a model
of traditional enforcement-will be in jeopardy. 1 15 Should the Court
hold that this tool generally is available, the Court runs the risk that
state authorities simply might not comply, and that courts will be confronted with a federal executive reluctant to enforce those federal judicial decrees.
b. Reprise: Was There a Right?
In any event, sufficient funds were not forthcoming in Pugh and
James, and the decision of the courts not to push the matter further
spelled the end of that litigation. Yackle does not give us his opinion of
whether conditions in the prisons at the time the cases were settled met
the dictates of the Supreme Court's Rhodes decision. One gets the impression, however, that although progress was made over the course of a
decade-and not insubstantial progress at that-in the end the judicial
enforcement mechanism fell short. The prisoners did not get what once
a court said rightfully was theirs.
The shortfall between right and remedy necessarily is difficult to
assess, however, because all parties to the prison litigation-including
the courts-apparently engaged in the age-old tactic of declaring victory and withdrawing from the field. The judicial perspective on this
tactic is most important. Judge Varner recognized early on the embarrassment of maintaining judicial decrees that could not be enforced." 6
The Eleventh Circuit apparently also was clever enough not to leave the
judicial system in the position of ordering relief it could not enforce.
Rather, in the face of a decree that was proving unenforceable-a right
114. 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted in part, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989).
115. Should the Supreme Court hold that federal courts are without any authority to raise
funds to implement judicial remedial orders, one is faced with the question whether decisions finding rights violations and ordering remedies do not become impermissible advisory opinions. See
generally P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-72 (3d ed. 1988). The Court simply may choose the course of
the Eighth Circuit in Jenkins, holding that a court may impose a remedy, but requiring that the
state determine how to implement the remedy, including making any necessary decision about how
to raise funds. The court may not order an increase in taxes, but may use "traditional" remedies,
such as contempt, to ensure compliance with its order. See Jenkins, 855 F.2d at 1315-16. Difficulty
arises, however, because the body generally responsible for raising funds also is generally outside
the contempt authority of the federal court. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
116. See supra note 102.
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that could not be remedied-the Eleventh Circuit did the only thing it
could to avoid judicial humiliation. It modified the right.117 Having lowered expectations with respect to what the Constitution guaranteed, it
then was possible to agree the judiciary had provided everything to
which the prisoners were entitled.118
Perhaps then it is meaningless to talk of rights without considering
remedies. What good, after all, is a right if it is unenforceable? Rather
than discussing the right as the measure of the remedy, which is the
"traditional" way of doing things, Yackle's story of the prison litigation
suggests that just the opposite equally is true: the ability to implement
a remedy is itself the measure of the right. If there is no remedy, there
is no right at all.
c. Finale: The Power of Politics
This conclusion, however, sounds a pessimistic ring, and Yackle's
book need not be read in this fashion. Indeed, Yackle strives to make
this point from the outset. His is, to be sure, a tale of Regret, but it also
has an optimistic message: it is as well a tale of Reform.
What Yackle teaches is that there is another way of doing business
separate and apart from the traditional judicial method of enforcement
that invites confrontation and irreconcilable conflict. The alternative
method was Judge Johnson's way. That method is politics.
Johnson is a judge, but a judge with an astute political sense. He
began his project with a realistic assessment of the possibility of
change, and never seems to have abandoned it. He moved the prison
litigation along always with an eye on what was politically feasible. He
accomplished what he could and did not seem to worry about what he
could not.
Judge Johnson's treatment of the judicial decree might be the best
example of this attitude. Varner saw the decree in the traditional light.
Judicial decrees were edicts from on high that had to be enforced.' 19
Modification of a decree was possible, but modification was the exception, not the rule. Johnson, on the other hand, was flexible. At best the
decree was a guideline, an aspiration. No one doubted for a moment
117. See Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1984). This result essentially was the effect of the Eleventh Circuit holding that contempt was improper unless the district
court reassessed the decree in light of Rhodes. Given the very good argument that Rhodes had
little or nothing to do with conditions in the Alabama prisons, see supra note 110, the Eleventh
Circuit's decision easily can be interpreted as reassessing the extent of the prisoners' rights.
118. This consequence was the ultimate result of the Alabama prison litigation. Although the
settlement decree did not specify that the State was in compliance with the original decree, it did
indicate the State's efforts were "sufficient" to recommend an end to the litigation. See supra
notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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that Johnson meant what he decreed and would strive to enforce it, but
at the same time, Johnson was willing to modify the decree in the face
of good faith enforcement efforts.120
For Johnson, keeping the ball rolling was everything. The decree
and its implementation were not an end so much as they were a
means-a means of reforming an institution Johnson believed was in
dire need of reform.
It is impossible to say what ultimately would have happened if
Varner had not replaced Johnson. After all, Johnson bowed out just as
Fob James took over as receiver. It is possible Johnson ultimately
would have proceeded no further than Varner, that outside forces
would have brought the litigation to a halt. One suspects, however, that
Johnson's political sense would have kept him from permitting matters
to come to a head. Instead, the litigation would have inched along, reforming the prisons bit by bit.
Of course, the measure of success in politics is different than that
of traditional legal remedies. Traditional legal remedies set milestones
and compliance is expected. Shortfalls spell failure. In politics, on the
other hand, everything is a product of compromise. Progress is progress,
and one is prepared to settle for half a loaf.
C. Encore: Marbury v. Madison
Under the traditional model of the law of remedies, a court determines whether a right has been violated. If so, the court decrees a remedy. A civilized society expects no less than that government should be
accountable when it violates the rights of its citizens.
This model is a nice one, but Yackle's story makes clear it is an
idealized one, at least in the realm of public law litigation. Once the
rights at stake are recognized as broad based, and the violations as systemic, the problem of remedying those violated rights becomes inseparable from the realm of politics. In politics, however, absolute
accomplishment of original goals is rare, if not unheard of.
There is no reason, however, that this model-this traditional
model-need be recognized as the only correct one. Rather, public law
litigation may be seen as political, with courts achieving what their authority permits. If citation is needed, Marbury will suffice. Every law
student knows-though perhaps too quickly forgets-the ending of the
Marbury story: that William Marbury's rights were sacrificed on the
altar of politics. Marshall maintained Marbury had a right to his com120. See, e.g., REFORM AND REGRET, supra note 1, at 130-31 (discussing Johnson's willingness
to amend the cell-size requirement "if only the sixty-foot requirement stood in the way of a bargain that would end the attorney general's resistance").
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mission. But John Marshall knew full well that requiring delivery of the
commission was a remedy he could not hope to enforce.1 21 Seizing the
moment, then, Marshall took the case as an opportunity to accomplish
what he could, which in retrospect was far more than awarding William
Marbury his commission. It was in this tradition that Judge Johnson
operated, and it is this tradition that Yackle describes so well.

121. There is an interesting question of whether the Supreme Court was the only court that
could have afforded Marbury the relief he requested. See Amar, supra note 90, at 461 n.90. Amar
argues that mandamus would not be available from state or circuit courts under the later holding
in McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821). The subsequent decision in Kendall v.
United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 615-26 (1838), "softens" Marbury's blow, however, by making circuit courts of the District of Columbia available for such mandamus actions.
Amar, supra note 90, at 461 n.90.
There is an equally interesting question of whether Justice Marshall's decision in Marbury
stands up against prior Supreme Court decisions. See Bloch & Marcus, John Marshall's Selective
Use of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 301, 322-27 (suggesting prior decisions of
the Supreme Court might have permitted issuance of the writ). The answer to this latter question,
while interesting in an academic sense, surely would not have made a difference in Marbury's case.
The brilliance of Marbury is Chief Justice Marshall's understanding that he could not help Marbury, but he could take advantage of the situation to enhance the role of the judiciary.

